counteract this growing movement, its potential impact is enormous.
This Comment discusses the serious challenge FIJA poses to the impartial administration of criminal justice. Part I examines the nature and scope of FIJA advocacy and its ability to influence the jury decision-making process. This section looks in particular to Turney v. Alaska," which involved the prosecution of a FIJA advocate who successfully persuaded jurors in a case he "lobbied" to "change their vote" to an acquittal. Part II considers the dangers FIJA poses to due process and the rule of law. In particular, this section examines the virtually universal state and federal common law rules that bar nullification instructions or any jury exposure to nullification arguments by counsel. By examining the reasons courts refuse to allow nullification instructions, the extent to which FIJA advocacy (which accomplishes the same result) is at odds with established judicial policy is revealed. Finally, Part III discusses the uncertain prospects for a remedy. This section reveals that, while history, tradition, and the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial place some limits on FIJA "lobbying," these limits may not be enough to stop FIJA from achieving its ultimate goal-fully informing every juror in America of its right and power to render verdicts in the teeth of both law and fact. This section explores Turney v. Alaska, 12 a case involving a FIJA advocate's challenge to a grand jury indictment for jury tampering arising from his protest activities at a state courthouse in Fairbanks, Alaska. This case merits attention for two reasons. First, the facts of Turney offer rare (though anecdotal) insight into both the effects of FIJA advocacy on the jury decision-making process, as well as the consequences of a jury be-coming aware of its own nullification powers. 13 This case also merits inquiry because, despite the hundreds of FIJA protests that occur every year, 14 Turney is the only published appellate opinion directly adjudicating the legality of FIJA activism under a state jury tampering statute.
Frank W. Turney regularly demonstrated in support of FIJA both inside and outside the Fairbanks courthouse between 1990 and 1994.1 Over the course of these four years, Turney used signs, bullhorns and a variety of other techniques to communicate with sitting and prospective jurors about their nullification "rights. "' 6 In the course of these protests, Turney would stand outside the wall of the jury assembly area and yell with his bullhorn. At other times, Turney would bleat like sheep at the prospective jurors and he would beat on the doors of the room, disrupting not only the jury assembly proceedings but also other court proceedings in adjoining areas of the building.1
The protests that finally led to Turney's arrest occurred in connection with the trial of one Merle Hall, a convicted felon who was being tried for knowing possession of a concealed weapon.' In July of 1994, jury selection was underway for Hall's trial. 19 Turney closely monitored Hall's case, sitting in on much of the jury selection process and the trial. 20 Turney's interest in the case arose from both his friendship with Hall as well as his opposition to the statute under which Hall was to be prosecuted. 2 ' Before trial, Hall's attorney had predicted that the jury s As Part II reveals, courts have long forbade affirmative instruction on the nullification prerogative. SeeinfraPartI.
See discussion infra Part I.B.
"Turney v. Alaska, 922 P.2d 283, 285 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) , af 'd, 936 P.2d 533 (Alaska 1997) . 'a Turne'y, 936 P.2d at 536. 9 Brief of Respondent at 2, Turney v. Alaska, 936 P.2d 533 (Alaska 1997) (No. S-6932).
2 Id. at 3. 2, Turney, 936 P.2d at 536. FIJA advocates often target cases involving so-called "victimless crimes" (or, in FIJA vernacular, "crimes against the government"). See Larry Dodge, Four Citeria for Deciding When and Where to Leaflet, THE FIJACrIvxST, WinterSpring 1996, at 5. FIJA leaders also encourage "leafleting" trials when the defendant so requests. Id.
1997]
would quickly return a guilty verdict by virtue of his client's facial violation of the Alaska statute. 22 The attorney took the case to trial solely to preserve an issue for appeal. 23 During the course of the jury selection process and trial, Frank Turney on several occasions communicated with both prospective and impaneled jurors. 4 Allan Coty, for example, was among the prospective jurors ultimately selected for trial.2 When Coty arrived for jury duty at the Fairbanks courthouse on the 14th of July, he saw Turney holding up a sign that said 1-800-Tel-Jury. 6 Later that day, as the prospective jurors walked to the courtroom for jury selection, Turney approached Coty and several other prospective jurors. 27 Turney told them to call 1-800-Tel-Jury if they had any "questions" about jury nullification. s After completion of jury selection, Turney again approached the jurors and told them to telephone the number. 29 During the course of the Hall trial, Turney continued to make contact with the jurors. 3 0 At one point, for example, jurors Lena Flood and Richard Ellis left the jury room for a cigarette break. 3 ' While the two jurors were standing in the hallway, Turney approached and asked them to telephone 1-800-TelJury. 32 Flood tried to ignore Turney, but she heard his message nonetheless. 33 Ellis took note of Turney's advertisement and later called the number. 34 22 Brief of Respondent at 2-3, Turney (No. S-6932).
23 id. 21 Id. Whether improper communications with a prospective juror constitute jury tampering depends on how the state defines 'juror." See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.900(3) (Michie 1996) (defining a 'juror" as a person who "is a member of an impaneled jury" or "has been drawn or summoned to attend as a prospective juro"') (emphasis added At the time of these events, a caller to 1-800-Tel-Jury would have heard the following voice-mail message prepared by FJA:
Thank you for calling the Fully Informed Jury Association. FIJA is a nonprofit educational association that wants all Americans to know their rights asjurors to judge the law itself as well as the facts regardless of the instructions from the judge because jurors cannot be punished for their verdict. [Jurors] are the final check and balance on our government, with more power than the President, Congress, or the Supreme Court. To talk to a live person, call 406-793-5550 or we will mail you more free information on jury veto power, if you tell us how you heard of us. Then name and spell your name, address, and zip code. Here's the tone.
[Tone] ."
As the trial progressed, juror Ellis told another juror, Jeanine Paluck, that he had called the "1-800" number advertised by Turney 36 Ellis also told Paluck that calling the number "would open [her] eyes." 3 7 Paluck later called the number and was told by FIJA that "jurors are powerful and can keep the government in check."3 When asked whether the recording was in conflict with the trial judge's instructions, Paluck testified that:
Well, basically when the judge instructs us, they tell us that... you can't vote your feelings, you have to vote according to the letter of the law. And the-and the tell jury deal, from what I gathered from the recording that I got that I have more rights than what was read to me by the judge.
9
Jury deliberations in the Hall trial began at about 1:00 p.m.
on Monday, July 18.40 The jury deliberated well into the afternoon but was unable to reach a verdict.
4 ' Ten jurors were voting for conviction, two for acquittal. 42 When deliberations recommenced the following morning, Ellis told his fellow jurors that he had phoned the "1-800" num- ber Turney advertised. 43 Ellis said that by calling this number he learned that "we weren't told our full rights" in the jury instructions. 4 Ellis also said that FIJA taught him that the jury did not have to "follow the law" in the decision-making process. " Nesbitt, supra note 2, at 1K. 14 Id. To avoid conflict between state activists and courthouse authorities, the national FIJA association offers "leafleting guidelines" for activists who picket courthouses. A FIJA brochure (which is available on-line) explains the strategies of courthouse "leafleting": [Vol. 88
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the State of California, over a million brochures are distributed at various courthouses by FIJA activists every year. 5 Oklahoma coordinator Lorianne Homer says she has distributed "thousands, just thousands" of leaflets at courthouses throughout Oklahoma. Similarly, activists in New Jersey claim to have distributed materials at courthouses "every week for three years," 57 and the leader of the Texas organization says her members picket "hundreds of cases every year throughout Texas.""'
The best time to be [at the courthouse] is when the whole jury pool is first assembled (often on Monday morning; be there bright and early). At this time they are not official jurors, and the authorities will be less likely to hassle you....
FIJA activists should make it clear that they are only passing out information of general interest to all jurors, and not trying to influence any particular case. FIJA literature, which informs jurors of their rights and powers in general terms and which seeks reform of the judicial process, is protected speech under the first amendment.... Literature distribution is most effective if you dress neatly and conservatively, smile, and are polite. A FIJA button on your lapel would also be appropriate ....
You're more likely to encounter trouble if you insist on distributing brochures inside the courthouse, but it has been done successfully. In any case, if the powers that be react at all, expect them to warn you first and ask you to leave. Fully Informed Jury Ass'n, Distributing FIJA Literature in Front of Courthouses (visited Feb. 16, 1997) <http://nowscape.com/fija/fija-us.htm>.
'-Harnsberger explains that "some areas are more active than others," but estimates that "at minimum, each state organization is handing out 2,500 copies of our brochure at local courthouses every month." Telephone Interview with Jim Hamsberger, FIJA California Coordinator (Jan. 30, 1997) . With "active chapters in 42 states," says Harnsberger, "that makes for upwards of 1.2 million copies" distributed per year at courthouses throughout the country. Id. Harnsberger himself claims to have distributed "about 5,000" nullification pamphlets every month for two years at the courthouse of the San Diego Superior Court, stopping only after he was held in contempt for failure to obey court directives barring such activities. Id. See also Fully Informed Jury Ass'n v. County of San Diego, No. 95-55121 (9th Cir. Feb. 23 1996) , available in 1996 WL 80208 (upholding constitutionality of court orders barring FIJA activities and newsracks within 50 feet of the San Diego Superior Courthouse), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 63 (1996) 256 (1995) . According to Abramson, these "advocates ofjury nullification mailed leaflets to the (supposedly anonymous) jurors, urging them to nullify federal gun laws by acquitting the defendants." Id.
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Other state coordinators make similar claims 5 9 FIJA National also claims to have 3,000 dues-paying members nationwide. Jan. 12, 1996 , at 5A (noting FIJA efforts to "change the Montana Constitution to permit juries to decide the law themselves rather than be required to follow instructions from judges"); Frank Santiago, A Red-Hot Subject for fudges, Lawyers, DES MoiNEs REG., Dec. 17, 1995, at This section has attempted to reveal the nature and scope of FIJA protest activities. The next section attempts to show the legal, normative, and historical problems posed by FIJA advocacy on and about America's courthouse lawns. For over 100 years, federal and state courts have striven to prevent juror consciousness of the nullification prerogative.
II. THEJURISPRUDENCE ON NULLIFICATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
This section discusses the doctrine of jury nullification and identifies the various reasons why American courts refuse to give nullification instructions. By identifying the problems courts associate with nullification instructions, the dangers inherent in FIJA advocacy are revealed. This is because nullification instructions and FIJA advocacy are two roads to the same evil-open instruction to juries on their power to ignore the law.
A. THE NULITFICATION POWER
It has long been recognized that juries have the power to render verdicts inconsistent with the criminal law. 71 Since jury acquittals are never subject to appellate review, 72 a "not guilty" verdict will always be final regardless of the jury's reasoning or its interpretation of the facts. 73 Consequently, juries in criminal during the trial of the two men accused of bombing Oklahoma City's federal building. See Thomas G. Watts, Growing Movement Seeks Broader Jury Discretion, LAS VEGAS REv.J., Nov. 19, 1995, at 1I . That trial was subsequently moved to Denver, Colorado.
" In Pennsylvania, a 26-year-old man was acquitted on obstruction of justice charges stemming "from his distribution of leaflets for the Fully Informed Jury Association at the Perry County Courthouse in 1994." Appeal Reverses T-shirt Conviction,
" See, e.g., Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920) (a jury sitting at criminal law "has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts"); United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105 (11th Cir. 1983 ) (juries have the power to nullify the law); Lessard v. Wyoming, 719 P.2d 227, 231 (Wyo. 1986) (same).
2 The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "No person shall.., be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (jury acquittals may not be reviewed).
'A jury's right to render a general verdict (which does not specify how it applied the law to the facts of its case) further insulates its reasoning from appellate review. See Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 647 (Cal. 1986 ) (Bird, C.J., concurring in part and 1997]
FULLY NFORMED "JURZES trials are said to enjoy a de facto "nullification" power-i.e., a power to acquit (or convict) a defendant regardless of the law or the weight of evidence. 74 The great distinction in American jury nullification doctrine, however, is that while juries enjoy an unrestrained power to nullify the law, courts almost universally forbid this power to be explained to juries. 7 5 The prevailing view among jurisdictions is that affirmative instruction on the ability to nullify would lead to lawlessness in the jury decision-making process. 76 [I]t cannot seriously be urged that, when asked by the jurors, a trial judge must advise them: "I have instructed you on the law applicable to this case. Follow it or ignore it, as you choose." Such advice may achieve pragmatic justice in isolated instances, but we suggest the more likely result is anarchy.
77
Thus, whatever may have been the practice of common law England or the courts of the early American Republic, 78 modem American juries are not instructed to determine or weigh the utility or validity of the law. 79 Although the great majority of American courts recognize the power of a jury to nullify, 80 neither the defendant's attorney, 81 nor the court," is typically almean that ajury is free to disregard existing law of the state and legislate on its own in each case"); Malone v. State, 660 N.E.2d 619, 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (ajury's right under the Indiana Constitution "to determine the law as well as the fact is neither absolute nor exclusive"); Hebron v. State, 627 A.2d 1029, 1036 (Md. 1993) ("the jury's role with respect to law is limited to resolving conflicting interpretations of the law of the crime and determining whether that law should be applied in dubious factual situations").
People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 726 n.39 (Cal. 1983) . See also Ballard, 715 P.2d at 647 (Bird, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 78 In the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries, American juries were sometimes told of their ability to judge both law and fact. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 73, at 135. As John Adams (hardly a populist) wrote in 1771, "[i]t is not only [the juror's] right, but his duty... to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court." 2 THE WORKS oFJoHN ADAMS 254-55 (1850). ChiefJustice Jay held a similar view, writing in 1794 that " [i] t is the province of the jury ... to determine both the law as well as the fact in [a civil] controversy." Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794). Indeed, there is much evidence of the general acceptance ofjury nullification in the period immediately after the adoption of the Constitution. See ABRAMSON, supra note 58, at 17-95. In modern times, however, jury nullification is viewed critically. This is due in part to the sour ends toward which jury nullification was used in the late Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. In the 1960s, for example, jury nullification enabled some Southern juries to shield local racial preferences. Id. at 62. See also discussion infra Part ILB (discussing of the drawbacks ofjury nullification).
Arguably, the collapse of American moral and cultural unity has been the downfall of jury nullification in America. Multiculturalism, moral pluralism, and natural law institutions do not well mix. Courts and commentators offer five primary reasons whyjuries are not explicitly instructed on their nullification powers.
Rule of Law v. Rule of Men
At the core of American constitutional jurisprudence is the notion that ours is a government of laws, not of men.
84 Under the rule of law, citizen behavior is regulated not according to the passions and prejudices of human beings, but according to objective, published laws formally sanctioned by elected representatives through a pre-ordained process. As a federal judge sitting at criminal law aptly observed in 1941:
Our American system represents the collective wisdom, the collective industry, the collective common sense of people who for centuries had been seeking freedom, freedom from the tyranny of government actuated or controlled by the personal whims and prejudices of kings and torney's nullification argument); People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Gal. Super. Ct. 1995), Reporter's Tr. of Proceedings, Sept. 28, 1995, Vol. 232, at 47793-8036, 9 :01 a.m., available in LEXIS, Cal. library, OJTRAN file (showing celebrity defendant's attorney arguing (in essence) forjury nullification by remarking that jurors should "set the standards" of "right and wrong" with reference to "common sense" and not law); which addressed the issue of jury nullification in the federal court system. Holding that it is the right and duty of the trial judge to instruct the jury to follow the law, the Court wrote that:
Public and private safety alike would be in peril if the principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, [be told to] disregard the law as expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto themselves. Under such a system, the principal function of the judge would be to preside and keep order while jurymen, untrained in the law, would determine questions affecting life, liberty, or property according to such legal principles as, in their judgement, were applicable to the particular case being tried.... We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty ofjuries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.&
The Ninth Circuit has criticized nullification arguments by counsel as violative of the rule of law in even stronger terms:
If we... allow lawyers to appeal for jury nullification at will and indefinitely, and if we grant defendants a Sixth Amendment right to explain themselves in legally irrelevant terms-then we move to a "system" in which the loudest voice carries the day, in which the phrase "order in the court" literally has no meaning, and in which the [rule of] law has about as much force as the Cheshire Cat's grin. 89 Stated another way, the principal danger in giving juries an affirmative option to ignore the criminal law is that the jury is thereby transformed from a factfinding into a law-making body. 9 0 In so doing, nullification instructions convert juries into junior ' United States v. Dewey, 37 F. Supp. 449, 449-50 (1941 REv. 859, 862-66 (1992) . [Vol. 88 "FULLY NFORMED "JURIES varsity legislatures whose decisions undermine the impartial determination of justice based on published law. 91 Thus, explicit nullification instructions would convey "an implied approval that runs the risk of degrading the legal structure [below the level of integrity] requisite for true freedom, for an ordered liberty that protects against anarchy as well as tyranny." 9 2 By refusing to allow the nullification power to be explained to juries, courts better ensure that jurors use the nullification power sparingly, departing from the rule of law only where their own conscience naturally compels a veto of ajudge's instructions. 3
Due Process
A second and related reason courts refuse nullification instructions is that they would frustrate due process. 94 As the venerable Latin maxim nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege provides, there shall be "no crime without law, nor punishment without law." 95 This maxim rings true today in the constitutional due process requirement that criminal liability and punishment be based only "upon a prior legislative enactment of a prohibition expressed with adequate precision and clarity." 96 By affirmatively authorizing juries to assign moral blame inconsistent with the law, nullification instructions confuse juries and increase the odds that a defendant will be convicted of conduct he is not on notice to avoid. 8 Nullification instructions also frustrate due process by thwarting a defendant's "fundamental right" to a fair, impartial trial byjury.9 The Sixth Amendmentl°° guarantees every criminal defendant a trial based exclusively on the evidence of record, 101 in accordance with the law, 1 0 2 and free from outside influences. 03 By making the jury the "finder of law" as well as fact, however, nullification instructions encroach upon the promise of due process. For what better way to ensure a verdict outside the law than to instructjurors that they may ignore it.1 04
Democracy
Closely related to their damaging effect on due process and the rule of law, nullification instructions also run contrary to democratic principles. As the D.C. Circuit observes, "[a]ny arnally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (holding that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning... violates the first essential of due process of law").
Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, TEX. L. RaV. 488, 518-20 (1976) .
See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) . See also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961) (stating that, among the safeguards for the preservation of "individual liberty and of the dignity and worth of every man .... the most priceless... is that of trial by jury"); Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1990 ) (the right to a fair trial is a fundamental right); State v. Bush, 714 P.2d 818, 823 (Ariz. 1986 ) (en banc) (the right to a trial byjury is of "constitutional magnitude and importance").
.. The Sixth Amendment provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of tle accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel tor his defence. U.S. CoNsT guably salutary functions served by inexplicable jury acquittals would be lost if that prerogative were frequently exercised ...
[for] calling attention to that power could encourage the substitution of individual standards for openly developed community rules.""' 5 Indeed, the ultimate effect of nullification instructions is simply to give twelve "randomly selected individuals with no constituency but themselves" an open invitation to frustrate the policies of Congress or the state legislatures, whose laws in all probability will "reflect the majority's view." 1 ' 6 The undemocratic force of nullification instructions is particularly strong given that it takes not twelve but one nullifying juror to prevent conviction of a man guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 107 Nullification instructions are also inherently undemocratic because they frustrate the right of the people to insure that those who violate their laws do not go without punishment. 108 Furthermore, jurors who are forced into the unaccustomed role of making macro-social choices would undoubtedly tend to "overlook the broader implications of their decisions."°9
The Inappropriateness ofJuror Legislators
An additional rationale for denying nullification instructions is thatjuries are not competent to make the law. 1 15 (1978) (noting the public's "valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished"); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978) (noting society's right to "convict those who have violated its laws"). See also Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581, 598 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (noting the "inestimable right" of "invoking the penalties of the law upon those who criminally or feloniously attack our persons or our property").
t Simson, supra note 98, at 513 n.113. ,oId. at 513.
is highly questionable whether jurors should be instructed to "make" the law when a legislative body has already done the job for them. Congress and the state legislatures have superior expertise, resources and perspective to make macro-social decisions." Congress and the state legislatures also have greater access to relevant information, and much more time to reach a well-reasoned decision than does "a group of twelve citizens of no particular distinction snatched away from their primary vocations" to spend a couple of days in court. 
Inconsistent Application of Laws
The final reason courts deny nullification instructions is that allowing jury nullification would lead to inconsistent application of laws."' If nullification instructions were allowed, local, state and federal penal laws would never be uniformly applied. Rather, their application would depend entirely on the idiosyncrasies of particular juries." 5 For this reason, nullification instructions pose the greatest threat to the fair and consistent application of federal criminal laws-laws with which local biases may be in greater conflict. Indeed, nullification instructions are ultimately an invitation to greater parochialism in the jury decision-making process." 8 By legitimizing local biases, nullification instructions run the risk of immunizing "criminal acts visited upon members of society's 'discrete and insular minorities ... .""19 In the 1960s, for example, jury nullification was used by some Southern juries to shield local racial preferences and block enforcement of federal civil rights legislation. 20
Nullification Policies of the States: Conclusion
This discussion has identified the major reasons courts, while recognizing the power of juries to nullify the law, nonetheless refuse to allow juries to be explicitly informed of this power. To some, this arrangement is hypocritical. 2 To others, it is outrageous.
Nevertheless, it strikes a necessary balance in a system based on the rule of law and which also refuses to police the minds of jurors to ensure the legal propriety of their decisions1ss The rise of the Fully Informed Jury Association has shaken the modem jurisprudence on jury nullification. The current jurisprudence-wary as it is of asking juries to judge the law-operates on the assumption that the only way jurors will discover their nullification powers is by being informed of these powers by an officer of the court. Silencing attorneys and refusing nullification instructions, however, is no longer an adequate solution to the nullification problem. With the rise of FIJA, judges are no longer the sole gate keepers of that secret and powerful 114 message.
Consequently, as the FIJA movement continues to grow it will become necessary for the jurisdictions to develop new approaches to the nullification problem that are more mindful ofjuror awareness ofjury nullification.
III. SOLUTIONS: A LIMITED PALETTE
This final section explores some possible ways to reduce the problems posed by the FIJA movement. Because of the constitutional status of jury trials and the broad protections of the First Amendment, none of these "solutions" fully resolve the ultimate "problem"-the fact that FIJA has a right to talk with almost anyone it wants to about jury nullification. Nonetheless, this section offers five possible ways the legal system can dilute the problems FIJA creates: (1) better control of FIJA demonstrations near courthouses; (2) better screening of jurors during voir dire; (3) more explicit jury instructions on the duty of jurors to follow the law; (4) promulgation of error-correcting devices to remedy the effects of jury nullification; and (5) application of the juror impeachment doctrine to tainted criminal convictions. Each suggestion, and its weaknesses, is addressed in turn. 
Containment of FJA Activities
The most obvious remedy to the FIJA problem is to reign in the movement itself. Local governments should take greater efforts to stop FIJA protectors from confronting jurors in unacceptable ways. As illustrated by Turney v. Alaska, 1 2 FIJA activities may violate jury tampering statutes.
12 6 It is imperative that local prosecutors bring charges against FIJA activists under these statutes.
Courts should also use their inherent powers to issue orders or other regulations barring the presence on courthouse premises of any person who seeks to influence, interfere or impede the juror decision-making process. 1 2 The Superior Court of San Diego, for example, has issued orders for the specific purpose of barring FIJA activities on courthouse premises.
In 1994, it ordered all newsracks removed from its sidewalks after FIJA made its newsletter available in receptacles outside the front steps of '2 936 P.2d 533 (Alaska 1997). Turney is discussed supra Part I. 12 In most states, any unauthorized attempt to influence the outcome of a jury verdict in a particular case by communicating with ajuror constitutes jury tampering. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-2807 (West 1989 person commits jury tampering if, with intent to influence ajuror's vote, opinion, decision, or other action in a case, such person directly or indirectly, communicates with ajuror other than as part of the normal proceedings of the case"); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 1266 CODEANN. tit. 11, § (1995 ("[a] person is guilty of tampering with a juror when, with intent to influence the outcome of an official proceeding, [he] communicates with a juror in the proceeding, except as permitted by the rules of evidence governing the proceeding"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 454(1-A) (West 1996) (" [a] person is guilty of tampering with a juror, if that person contacts, by any means, a person who is ajuror or any other person the actor believes is in a position to influence ajuror and the actor does so with the intention of influencing the juror in the performance of the juror's duty"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.25 (McKinney 1996) ("[a] person is guilty of tampering with ajuror ... when, with intent to influence the outcome of an action or proceeding, he communicates with ajuror in such action or proceeding, except as authorized by law"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-508 (1996) ("[a] person commits an offense who... influences or attempts to influence ajuror not to vote or to vote in a particular manner"). 
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[Vol. 88 the courthouse.'9 That court has also issued a general order barring the distribution of any materials intended to influence the jury decision-making process on or about courthouse premises. IS°T he obvious limitation of the "containment" approach, however, is that the First Amendment limits the extent to which FIJA activities may be contained. As a general matter, speech concerning the policies of all three branches of government is protected by the First Amendment.
3 ' In the famous words of the Supreme Court, "the First Amendment reflects 'a profound national commitment' to the principle that 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open." Feb. 23 1996) , available in 1996 WL 80208 (unpublished opinion upholding constitutionality of the order under the public forum doctrine), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 63 (1996) .
" General Order 10-20-93 prohibits
[t]he distribution or attempted distribution of any written materials tending to influence, interfere or impede the lawful discharge of the duties of a trialjuror, and [any] communication [attempting] to so communicate with any person summoned, drawn, or serving as a trial juror in these courts for purposes of so influencing, interfering, or impeding the lawful discharge of the duties of a trial juror in or within 50 yards of any public entrance of the facilities within which Courts conductjury trials within this County. Commentary ... on the criminal justice system is at the core of First Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with the administration of government ....
[F]ree and robust.. . criticism and debate can contribute to public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system, as well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability.
Furthermore, peaceful picketing and leafleting for political purposes are considered expressive activities involving "speech" and are thus generally protected by the First Amendment. 13 4 Indeed, picketing and leafleting in places historically associated with free exercise of expressive activities-such as streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public fora-are given special protection. 1 35 Under the so-called "public forum doctrine," the government may only enforce reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech occurring in "public fora"-and only so long as the restrictions are "content neutral,... narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and.., open [to] ample alternative channels of communication." 3 s Absolute bars to specific types of public fora expressions are constitutional only if the restricting regulation is "narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.", 3 7
Despite the great protections afforded to political and public fora speech, however, there remain strong and well defined limits that may-and indeed must-be imposed on FIJA activities. For " [t] he right of free speech, strong though it be, is not absolute .... ,,lss Rather, "the First Amendment... must yield to the 'most fundamental of all freedoms-the right to a fair trial for the accused."" ' 9 Indeed, free speech has long been contained in the context of criminal trials. 40 In order to protect a defendant's Sixth [Vol. 88 Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury, for example, tight controls are placed on the arguments each party may make to the jury. Misleading, inflammatory, and hearsay evidence are all excluded to prevent jurors from being "led astray" or having an inappropriate emotional response.1
Rules of practice also shield jurors from broad policy arguments by prohibiting defense attorneys from injecting "issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law" at trial.
14 2
The controls that the rules of court place on speech are not limited to the parties at trial. The very purpose ofjury and witness tampering statutes, for example, is to deny the Frank Turthe best chance of discovering truth when the government refrains from regulating the free exchange of ideas. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964) . See also Brief of Respondents at 31, Turney v. Alaska, 936 P.2d 533 (Alaska 1997) . Under this model of truthfinding, the damaging effects of false and misleading speech are not remedied by shielding the listener. The appropriate remedy is "more speech, not enforced silence." 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 Ct. , 1505 Ct. (1996 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 257, 277 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). Truth is to be discovered not by paternal guidance but "through its competition with falsehood for acceptance" in the marketplace of ideas. State v. O'Neil Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 532 (Alaska 1980).
A wholly different and constitutionally required model of truthfinding is embodied in the criminal justice system and the regulations that govern jury trials. Brief of Respondents at 31, Turney (No. 8-6932). In the courtroom forum, truth is found not through robust and wide-open discussion but through strict controls on the speech to which jurors are exposed. See, e.g., Paterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886, 895 (Del. 1987) . Rather than remedy misleading speech with "more speech," federal and state rules of evidence and criminal procedure shield jurors from the "communicative impact" of potentially prejudicial "speech" that is otherwise valued in public discourse. See, e.g., LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 790 (2d ed. 1988). "[A] trial is not a 'free trade in ideas,' nor is the best test of truth in a courtroom 'the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."' Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 283 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Rather, a trial "is circumscribed in the range of its inquiry and in its methods by the Constitution, by laws, and by age-old tradi- neys of the world any role in the jury decision-making process. 4 ' Under no circumstances may any third party-including well meaning citizens-exert legitimate influence over a criminal trial. 44 Indeed, trial spectators can be removed at the whim of the trial judge, and can be held in contempt for misbehavior. 4 5 Similarly, lawyers advocating on behalf of their clients have no independent First Amendment rights in the courtroom.' 46 An attorney, for example, may not, by speech or conduct, resist a ruling of the trial court "beyond the point necessary to preserve a claim for appeal.' 4 7
In short, the free speech interests of non-parties to criminal trials are "minuscule" in comparison to the Sixth Amendment interests of defendants and society in general.
The judicial branch and its jurors simply are not subject to solicitation: 14 Brief of Respondent at 32, Turney (No. S-6932). The exception to this rule arises when the third party is an amicus curiae. An amicus curiae may be given leave to file a third party brief or even submit an argument under certain circumstances, such as where important questions of public policy are at issue. See, e.g., Giammalvo v. Sunshine Mining Co., 644 A.2d 407, 408-09 (Del. 1994 ) (discussing the historical role of amicus curiae). In any event, however, it is clear that non-parties are never allowed to casually "contribute" to a criminal trial.
' See Hope v. State, 732 P.2d 905, 908 (Okla. Grim. App. 1987 ) ("the privilege to remove a spectator from the courtroom is clearly within the sound discretion of the trial judge"). See also International Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994) (noting that courts have the inherent power "to impose silence, respect, and decorum... and submission to their lawful mandates. . ." (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821) ).
146 See Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 1992 ) (Trott, J., concurring) ("a lawyer properly functioning as such on behalf of a client has no independent First Amendment rights in the courtroom").
"7 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) . See also Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8 (1952) .
14 See, e.g., Kilgus v. Cunningham, 602 F. Supp. 735, 740 (D.N.H. 1985 ) (a speaker's interest in communicating with witness is "minuscule" and not protected by the First Amendment); Dawkins v. State, 208 So. 2d 119, 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) ("[e] fforts to influence a grand jury in its deliberations respecting specific matters under investigation are not shielded by the constitutional right of free speech").
"9 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965) (upholding state statute barring pickets or parades near state courthouse [ Courts are not subject to lobbying, judges do not entertain visitors in their chambers for the purpose or urging that cases be resolved one way or another, and they do not and should not respond to parades, picketing or pressure groups. Neither... should it appear to the public that the [courts are] subject to outside influence or that picketing or marching, singly or in groups, is an acceptable or proper way of appealing to or influencing the courts.
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t is thus clear that the free speech interests of folks like Frank Turney, who flag down jurors and explain the jury nullification power in casual terms, do not outweigh the due process and fair trial interests of criminal defendants.' 5 ' At the same time, however, it is also clear that standing in front of courthouses is not the only way FIJA can achieve its goals. FIJA could just as easily (though less effectively) hand out leaflets at bars and shopping malls rather than courthouses. And it is doubtful that FIJA could be prosecuted for jury tampering merely on account of its billboards, quarterly newsletter, 1-800 number, or website While these materials may ultimately frustrate the nullification policies of courts, 5 3 public discussion of jury nullification does not "violate" the Sixth Amendment.'
Simply put, the freedom of jurors to engage in jury nullification, and the right of individuals to talk about that freedom on the street, is despite First Amendment challenge by defendant); People v. McGuire, 751 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987 he right to a fair trial includes the right to a trial free from ... demonstrations which may contaminate or prejudicially affect the jury").
50 Grace, 461 U.S. at 183 (emphasis omitted). See also United States v. Carter, 717 F.2d 1216 , 1220 -21 (8th Cir. 1983 .
, ' Turney v. Alaska, 936 P.2d 533 (Alaska 1997); Fully Informed Jury Ass'n v. County of San Diego, No. 95-55121 (9th Cir. Feb. 23 1996 ) (unpublished opinion), available in 1996 WL 80208, cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 63 (1996 United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1980) . In Ogle, a tax protestor was convicted ofjury tampering after he passed out to potential jurors a pro-nullification Handbook for Jurors. The handbook stated, inter alia, that "it is unnecessary for jurors to follow the law of the land where they conceive of the law being contrary to their concepts of morals." Id. at 236.
' See supra note 7 and accompanying text. See also supra note 126 (listing various state jury tampering statutes).
155 See supra Part II.B.
5 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Perrucci, 117 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1953 ) (holding that a defendant insurance company's use of "out-of-court" advertisements to encourage jurors to deny excessive claims so as to avoid "increased insurance premium cost to the public" does not constitute contempt).
here to stay. Containment of FIJA speech is thus only a partial solution to the problems it creates.
Screening During Voir Dire
Voir dire is the process through which the prosecution, defense, and trial judge work together to select a fair and impartial jury panel from a list of potentialjurors. 55 Voir dire can thus be used to eliminate jurors who have been contacted by FIJA or who are otherwise "politically" predisposed to intentionally disregard the law. 156 Using voir dire to eliminate FIJA members or contactees from jury panels comports perfectly with the purpose of the procedure: to preserve the fair and impartial administration ofjustice by fleshing out any potential grounds for preemptory challenges. 7 Since judges play the central role in conducting voir dire in the federal courts and in many state courts, 158 judges in particular should be alert to any FIJA activities taking place on or near their courthouses when screening jurors.
Voir dire, however, can only do so much. Even assuming that jurors will always be honest during questioning, " [v] oir dire cannot necessarily be relied upon to compel jurors to admit either their exposure or their prejudice . . . ."'59 Furthermore, even if a juror has no sympathy whatsoever for the FIJA movement, he or she can be subtly influenced by a FIJA flyer or leaf-55 SeeFED. R. Cr. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRim. P. 24(a).
15 See, e.g., Hoffman, 117 F. Supp. at 40 (refusing to find insurance company in contempt for its advertising campaign aimed at discouraging large tort awards, reasoning in part that "[biefore ajury is empanelled to hear the action here involved, plaintiffs will have an opportunity to question the prospective jurors concerning the possible effect such advertisements and pamphlet may have on any award of damages which they may render"). See also Amicus Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union at 13-14, Turney v. Alaska, 936 P.2d 533 (Alaska 1997) (No. S-6932) (arguing that voir dire procedures and a judge's ability to instruct jurors to disregard outside influences moots the dangers of FIJA activism).
"7 See, e.g., Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (stating that "[vioir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored" and that the "lack of adequate voir dire impairs the defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges"). 
ClearJuy Instructions Explaining the Juror's Duty to Follow the Law
Juries instructed to judge the law will deliberate differently than those that are told they have a sworn duty to uphold and apply it.165 It is therefore critical that jury instructions and jury handbooks be drafted in ways that make clear the juror's duty to follow the law as laid down by the trial judge. Clear instructions on will help resolve any uncertainties caused by FIJA publications. They would also help relieve any burdens to the juror's psyche which, as the D.C. Circuit explains, may arise upon leaning that "it is he who fashions the rule that condemns. " 166 Fortunately, many jury instructions and handbooks already make clear the juror's duty to follow the law. California judges, for example, instruct jurors of their "duty to apply the law as I '0 Brief of Respondent at 45, 187, 192 (1986) (noting that voir dire, sequestration, continuance, attorney gag orders, and other devices are useful tools for dealing with jury bias).
" ' United States v. Allen, 736 F. Supp. 914, 918 (N.D. Ill. 1990 ) ("the trial judge cannot rely upon any testimony of the jurors as to their subjective assessment of the actual impact of the extraneous evidence or influence on their deliberations" • . the jury the proper rules of law required to resolve the case." l r" Federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit are perhaps the most thorough in explaining the jury's duty to follow the law:
Ladies and Gentlemen: You now are the jury in this case and I want to take a few minutes to tell you about your duties as jurors.... It will be your duty to decide from the evidence what the facts are. You, and you alone, are the judges of the facts. You will hear the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then apply those facts to the law which I will give to you. This is how you will reach your verdict. In doing so you must follow that law whether you agree with it or not.&6
Jurisdictions should follow the Ninth Circuit and adopt jury instructions that make absolutely clear the jury's duty to follow the law. Such explicit instructions will better ensure that juries begin their deliberations with at least a presumption that they are not to purposefully deride the law through the fact-finding process. A clear statement of its proper role will also help the jury disbelieve FIJA propaganda-i.e., that 'Jurors [may] judge the law ... as well as the facts regardless of the instructions from the judge.' 70 Of course, even with such instructions, the jury will still possess the power to nullify the law. 17 1 However, clear instructions on the controlling nature of the law will better ensure that jurors depart from it only when their own consciencesand not a FIJA flyer-compel them to veto the judge's instructions. 
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power to avoid the law; it would now be the right to judgment by citizens whose verdict is free from legal error." 2 The insurmountable problem with Professor's Leipold's creative proposal, however, lies in its second and necessary component. As Leipold admits, the idea of government appeals in criminal cases "flies in the face of many Supreme Court opinions"-let alone the Constitution. 3 The Supreme Court has long interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause 8 4 to bar any appellate review of jury acquittals. As the Court stated over 100 years ago, "a verdict of acquittal, although not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offence." 18 For " [t] o permit a second trial after an acquittal, however mistaken the acquittal may have been, would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that 'even though innocent, he may be found guilty." '" 8 The bar against special verdicts in criminal trials is also of constitutional proportion. As the First Circuit has noted, " [i] t is one of the most essential features of the right of trial by jury that no jury should be compelled to find any but a general verdict in criminal cases, and the removal of this safeguard would violate its design and destroy its spirit." 8 7
Implementation of "error-correcting devices," being impossible, is thus not a viable solution to the FIJA threat. Although Leipold maintains that the bar on such devices "could be lifted "' Id. at 320. Even the most anxious "defendant's rights" advocates cannot deny that criminal defendants ought prefer trials free from legal error-even if such error might otherise "help" the defendant "get off." As Hegel pointed out, punishment honors the properly convictable criminal as a rational being by giving him what he deserves. See ROBINSON, supra note 95, at 33; see also Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 REV. , 1268 REV. (1976 (arguing that holding actors responsible "treats all persons as autonomous and capable of that most human capacity, the power to choose").
183 Leipold, supra note 172, at 318. "' U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("[n] o person shall.., be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb"). quittal under the juror impeachment doctrine even if the jury was subject to gross solicitations by a nullification advocate. 2
IV. CONCLUSION
For over 100 years, federal and state courts have striven to preserve due process and the rule of law by refusing to explicitly instructjuries on their defacto nullification powers. With the rise of the Fully Informed Jury Association, however, a growing number of jurors arrive at the courthouse with some awareness of this power. The FIJA movement thus poses a serious threat to the democratic and impartial administration of criminal justice; for by slipping de facto nullification instructions through the back door of the jury room, FIJA greatly increases the odds that the jury will render its verdict inconsistent the criminal law.
Worse yet, little can be done to counteract the movement. Despite the various remedial actions that might be taken to dilute FIJA's potency, the Sixth Amendment clearly grants the criminal jury unreviewable and almost absolute discretion in making its decisions. Indeed, it is precisely the absolute power vested in the criminal jury that makes the FIJA movement so penetrating.9 For ajury that is taught the legal reality that, no matter the facts of the case, an acquittal verdict is unreviewable and a guilty verdict will be given much deference on appeal, will '92 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (jury acquittals may not be reviewed). Even in the case of a misguided conviction, the Supreme Court has expressed hesitancy in allowing jurors to impeach their verdicts. For example, in Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) , the Court interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) to bar impeachment of a guilty verdict even though two jurors came forward with evidence that most of the other jurors were intoxicated throughout the trial and deliberations. The two jurors described the trial as "one big party," testifying that at least seven jurors (including the foreman) engaged in heavy drinking during lunch recesses, that three smoked marijuana "[]ust about every day," that two had snorted "a couple lines" of cocaine on several occasions, and that one juror had sold a quarter pound of marjuana to another during the trial. Id. at 115-16, 136; seegenerally Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Juy: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 218-29 (1989) . According to the Court, Rule 606(b) barred impeachment because the influences were not "external" to the deliberations. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 125. In any event, Tanner represents quite a "trip" from the Abramsonian view of the jury. [Vol. 88 "FULLY1NFORMED"JURIES also understand that it has nearly absolute power to determine questions of life, liberty, and property however it pleases. At that point, law is no more. Statutes become mere "suggestions" thatjurors (and their lobbyists) can rewrite to see that particular groups or political causes win.
T M In short, the "fully informed jury" is none other than a law unto itself, and indeed has "more power than Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court." 195 And so time will march on until either FIJA withers into nothingness or the rule of law comes to have "about as much force as the Cheshire Cat's grin." 1 9 True lovers of liberty will fear the latter over the former. Anarchy is no better friend of freedom than an overreaching government.
" See, e.g., BoRa, supra note 106, at 2. It is no answer that "good will" and "civic pride" will overcome juror passions. That is not the nature of man. As James Madison well understood:
The latent causes of faction are... sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal or different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points ....
[have] divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good .... TsE ... Turney v. Alaska, 936 P.2d 533, 536 n.1 (Alaska 1997) (quoting an outgoing message left on FIJA National's answering machine in 1996). "6 Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 1992) .
